In the received comment [1] to our paper [2] the authors expressed doubts about the results we presented, in par ticular, they claim that an attacker can completely emulate the normal operation of Bob's system using fake pulses even in the case of phase coding systems. This claim is illfounded due to the presence of a delay interferometer in Bob's sys tem: any transmitted fake pulse will be split into two in the adjacent time slots and will produce either two 'detector clicks' or none. Moreover, preservation of detection statis tics in the outer time slots in our understanding means not only leaving the probabilities themselves untouched, but also keeping the conditional probabilities of having the outer detector pulse given there is a detection in the central time window. As a result, due to the complexity of the system as well as the ability of legitimate users to monitor various statistics, including the conditional probabilities, the vague description given by the authors cannot be considered as a specific attack.
Cryptography, including quantum cryptography, is an exact science. Therefore, any quantum cryptography proto col, as well as an attack on it, must be clearly and concisely presented. To perform an attack Eve makes specific measure ments, obtains their results, prepares her own states in a cer tain way, and sends them to Bob. For an attack to be sound, it must be shown, in exact mathematical expressions that it does not change the monitored statistics of photocounts.
The main statement of our work was that the detector blind ing attack as it appears in the cited papers is detectable in systems with phase coding. Detectability directly follows from the pres ence of the delay interferometer and the conservation of energy in a distributed interference. If the authors really claim that a particular new attack with detector blinding for phase coding systems allows Eve to remain undetected, they need to provide a succinct description of the attack as well as the underlying math.
Overall, we find that one of our goals was to show a sig nificant structural difference between the polarization coding and phase coding systems. A consequence of such a difference results in the inability of blunt application of a well known attack to phase coding systems. The same strategy just does not work because of significantly broader monitoring abilities existing in phase coding systems.
Besides that, if new attacks that threatens the security of phase coding systems via detector blinding or other means show up, we will be interested in discussing them and invent ing effective protection.
